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Abstract
This paper presents a method to automatically and ef-
ficiently detect face tampering in videos, and particularly
focuses on two recent techniques used to generate hyper-
realistic forged videos: Deepfake and Face2Face. Tradi-
tional image forensics techniques are usually not well suited
to videos due to the compression that strongly degrades the
data. Thus, this paper follows a deep learning approach
and presents two networks, both with a low number of lay-
ers to focus on the mesoscopic properties of images. We
evaluate those fast networks on both an existing dataset and
a dataset we have constituted from online videos. The tests
demonstrate a very successful detection rate with more than
98% for Deepfake and 95% for Face2Face.
1. Introduction
Over the last decades, the popularization of smartphones
and the growth of social networks have made digital im-
ages and videos very common digital objects. According
to several reports, almost two billion pictures are uploaded
everyday on the internet. This tremendous use of digital im-
ages has been followed by a rise of techniques to alter image
contents, using editing software like Photoshop for instance.
The field of digital image forensics research is dedicated to
the detection of image forgeries in order to regulate the cir-
culation of such falsified contents. There have been several
approaches to detect image forgeries [8, 19], most of them
either analyze inconsistencies relatively to what a normal
camera pipeline would be or rely on the extraction of spe-
cific image alterations in the resulting image. Among oth-
ers, image noise [11] has been shown to be a good indicator
to detect splicing (copy-past from an image to another). The
detection of image compression artifacts [2] also presents
some precious hints about image manipulation.
Today, the danger of fake news is widely acknowledged
and in a context where more than 100 million hours of video
content are watched daily on social networks, the spread of
falsified video raises more and more concerns. While sig-
nificant improvements have been made for image forgery
detection, digital video falsification detection still remains
a difficult task. Indeed, most methods used with images can
not be directly extended to videos, which is mainly due to
the strong degradation of the frames after video compres-
sion. Current video forensic studies [16] mainly focus on
the video re-encoding [28] and video recapture [29, 15],
however video edition is still challenging to detect.
For the last years, deep learning methods has been suc-
cessfully employed for digital image forensics. Amongst
others, Barni et al. [2] use deep learning to locally detect
double JPEG compression on images. Rao and Ni [18]
propose a network to detect image splicing. Bayar and
Stamm [3] target any image general falsification. Rahmouni
et al. [17] distinguish computer graphics from photographic
images. It clearly appears that deep learning performs very
well in digital forensics, and disrupts traditional signal pro-
cessing approaches.
In the other hand, deep learning can also be used to fal-
sify videos. Recently, a powerful tool called Deepfake has
been designed for face capture and reenactment. This meth-
ods, initially devoted to the creation of adult content, has
not been presented in any academic publication. Deepfake
follows Face2Face [26], a non deep learning method intro-
duced by Thies et al. that targets similar goal, using more
conventional real-time computer vision techniques.
This paper addresses the problem of detecting these two
video editing processes, and is organized as follows: Sec-
tions 1.1 and 1.2 present more details on Deepfake and
Face2Face, with a special attention for the first one that has
not been published. In Section 2, we propose several deep
learning networks to successfully overcome these two fal-
sification methods. Section 3 presents a detailed evaluation
of those networks, as well as the datasets we assembled for
training and testing. Up to our knowledge, there is no other
method dedicated to the detection of the Deepfake video
falsification technique.
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1.1. Deepfake
Deepfake is a technique which aims to replace the face
of a targeted person by the face of someone else in a video.
It first appeared in autumn 2017 as a script used to gener-
ate face-swapped adult contents. Afterwards, this technique
was improved by a small community to notably create a
user-friendly application called FakeApp.
The core idea lies in the parallel training of two auto-
encoders. Their architecture can vary according to the out-
put size, the desired training time, the expected quality and
the available resources. Traditionally, an auto-encoder des-
ignates the chaining of an encoder network and a decoder
network. The purpose of the encoder is to perform a dimen-
sion reduction by encoding the data from the input layer
into a reduced number of variables. The goal of the de-
coder is then to use those variables to output an approxima-
tion of the original input. The optimization phase is done
by comparing the input and its generated approximation
and penalizing the difference between the two, typically us-
ing a L2 distance. In the case of the Deepfake technique,
the original auto-encoder is fed with images of resolution
64 × 64 × 3 = 12, 288 variables, encodes those images
on 1024 variables and then generates images with the same
size as the input.
The process to generate Deepfake images is to gather
aligned faces of two different peopleA andB, then to train
an auto-encoder EA to reconstruct the faces of A from the
dataset of facial images of A, and an auto-encoder EB to
reconstruct the faces of B from the dataset of facial images
ofB. The trick consists in sharing the weights of the encod-
ing part of the two auto-encoders EA and EB, but keeping
their respective decoder separated. Once the optimization
is done, any image containing a face of A can be encoded
through this shared encoder but decoded with decoder of
EB. This principle is illustrated in Figure 1 and 2.
Figure 1. Deepfake principle. Top: the training parts with the
shared encoder in yellow. Bottom: the usage part where images
ofA are decoded with the decoder ofB.
The intuition behind this approach is to have an encoder
that privileges to encode general information of illumina-
tion, position and expression of the face and a dedicated de-
coder for each person to reconstitute constant characteristic
shapes and details of the person face. This may thus sepa-
rate the contextual information on one side and the morpho-
logical information on the other.
In practice, the results are impressive, which explains the
popularity of the technique. The last step is to take the target
video, extract and align the target face from each frame, use
the modified auto-encoder to generate another face with the
same illumination and expression, and then merge it back in
the video.
Figure 2. Example of an image (left) being forged (right) using the
Deepfake technique. Note that the forged face lacks the expres-
siveness of the original.
Fortunately, this technique is far from flawless. Basi-
cally, the extraction of faces and their reintegration can fail,
especially in the case of face occlusions: some frames can
end up with no facial reenactment or with a large blurred
area or a doubled facial contour. However, those technical
errors can easily be avoided with more advanced networks.
More deeply, and this is true for other applications, auto-
encoders tend to poorly reconstruct fine details because of
the compression of the input data on a limited encoding
space, the result thus often appears a bit blurry. A larger
encoding space does not work properly since while the fine
details are certainly better approximated, on the other hand,
the resulting face loses realism as it tends to resemble the in-
put face, i.e. morphological data are passed to the decoder,
which is a undesired effect.
1.2. Face2Face
Reenactment methods, like [9], are designed to transfer
image facial expression from a source to a target person.
Face2Face [26], introduced by Thies et al., is its most ad-
vanced form. It performs a photorealistic and markerless
facial reenactment in real-time from a simple RGB-camera,
see Figure 3. The program first requires few minutes of pre-
recorded videos of the target person for a training sequence
to reconstruct its facial model. Then, at runtime, the pro-
gram tracks both the expressions of the source and target
actors video. The final image synthesis is rendered by over-
laying the target face with a morphed facial blendshape to
fit the source facial expression.
Figure 3. Example of a Face2Face reenactment result from the
demo video of the Face2Face paper [26].
2. Proposed method
This section presents several effective approaches to deal
with either Deepfake or Face2Face. It turned out that these
two problems can not be efficiently solved with a unique
network. However, thanks to the similar nature of the fal-
sifications, identical network structures for both problems
can yield good results.
We propose to detect forged videos of faces by placing
our method at a mesoscopic level of analysis. Indeed, mi-
croscopic analyses based on image noise cannot be applied
in a compressed video context where the image noise is
strongly degraded. Similarly, at a higher semantic level,
human eye struggles to distinguish forged images [21], es-
pecially when the image depicts a human face [1, 7]. That
is why we propose to adopt an intermediate approach using
a deep neural network with a small number of layers.
The two following architectures have achieved the best
classification scores among all our tests, with a low level
of representation and a surprisingly low number of parame-
ters. They are based on well-performing networks for image
classification [14, 23] that alternate layers of convolutions
and pooling for feature extraction and a dense network for
classification. Their source code is available online1.
2.1. Meso-4
We have started our experiments with rather complex ar-
chitectures and have gradually simplified them, up to the
following one that produces the same results but more effi-
ciently.
This network begins with a sequence of four layers of
successive convolutions and pooling, and is followed by
a dense network with one hidden layer. To improve gen-
eralization, the convolutional layers use ReLU activation
1https://github.com/DariusAf/MesoNet
functions that introduce non-linearities and Batch Normal-
ization [10] to regularize their output and prevent the van-
ishing gradient effect, and the fully-connected layers use
Dropout [24] to regularize and improve their robustness.
Figure 4. The network architecture of Meso-4. Layers and param-
eters are displayed in the boxes, output sizes next to the arrows.
In total, there are 27,977 trainable parameters for this
network. Further details can be found on Figure 4.
2.2. MesoInception-4
An alternative structure consists in replacing the first two
convolutional layers of Meso4 by a variant of the inception
module introduced by Szegedy et al [25].
The idea of the module is to stack the output of several
convolutional layers with different kernel shapes and thus
increase the function space in which the model is optimized.
Instead of the 5 × 5 convolutions of the original module,
we propose to use 3 × 3 dilated convolutions [30] in order
to avoid high semantic. This idea of using dilated convo-
lutions with the inception module can be found in [22] as
a mean to deal with multi-scale information, but we have
added 1×1 convolutions before dilated convolutions for di-
mension reduction and an extra 1×1 convolution in parallel
that acts as skip-connection between successive modules.
Further details can be found in Figure 5.
Replacing more than two layers with inception modules
Figure 5. Architecture of the inception modules used in
MesoInception-4. The module is parameterized using a, b, c, d ∈
N. The dilated convolutions are computed without stride.
did not offer better results for the classification. The chosen
parameters (ai, bi, ci, di) for the module at layer i can be
found in Table 1. With those hyper-parameters, this network
has 28,615 trainable parameters overall.
Layer a b c d
1 1 4 4 1
2 1 4 4 2
Table 1. Hyper-parameters for the modified Inception modules
used in MesoInception-4
3. Experiments
In this section we expose the results of the implementa-
tion of the two proposed architectures to detect the studied
digital forgeries. In order to extend our work to the real
case of online videos, we also discuss the robustness of our
method to video compression.
3.1. Datasets
3.1.1 Deepfake dataset
To our knowledge, no dataset gathers videos generated by
the Deepfake technique, so we have created our own.
Training auto-encoders for the forgery task requires sev-
eral days of training with conventional processors to achieve
realistic results and can only be done for two specific faces
at a time. To have a sufficient variety of faces, we have
rather chosen to download the profusion of videos available
to the general public on the internet.
Thus, 175 rushes of forged videos have been collected
from different platforms. Their duration ranges from two
seconds to three minutes and have a minimum resolution
of 854 × 480 pixels. All videos are compressed using the
H.264 codec but with different compression levels, which
puts us in real conditions of analysis. An accurate study
on the effect of compression levels is conducted on another
dataset introduced in Section 3.1.2.
All the faces have been extracted using the Viola-Jones
detector [27] and aligned using a trained neural network for
facial landmark detection [12]. In order to balance the dis-
tribution of faces, the number of selected frames for extrac-
tion per video is proportional to the number of camera angle
and illumination changes on the target face. As a reference,
approximately 50 faces were extracted per scene.
The dataset has then been doubled with real face images,
also extracted from various internet sources and with the
same resolutions. Finally, it has been manually reviewed to
remove misalignment and wrong face detection. As much
as possible, the same distribution of good resolution and
poor resolution images were used in both classes to avoid
bias in the classification task.
Precise numbers of the image count in each classes as
long as the separation into a set used for training and for
model evaluation can be found in Table 2.
3.1.2 Face2Face dataset
Additionally to the Deepfake dataset, we have examined
whether the proposed architecture could be used to detect
other face forgeries. As a good candidate, the FaceForen-
sics dataset [20] contains over a thousand forged videos and
their original using the Face2Face approach. This dataset is
already split into a training, validation and testing set.
More than extending the use of the proposed architecture
to another classification task, one advantage of the Face-
Forensics set is to provide losslessly compressed videos,
which has enabled us to evaluate the robustness of our
model with different compression levels. To be able to
compare our results with those from the FaceForensics pa-
per [20], we have chosen the same compression rate with
H.264: lossless compression, 23 (light compression), 40
(strong compression).
Only 300 videos were used for training out of more than
a thousand. For the model evaluation, the 150 forged video
and their original of the testing set were used. Details about
the number of extracted face images for each class can be
found in Table 2.
3.2. Classification Setup
We denote X the input set and Y the output set, the ran-
dom variable pair (X,Y ) taking values in X × Y , and f
the prediction function of the chosen classifier that takes
Set forged class real class
Deepfake training 5111 7250
Deepfake testing 2889 4259
Face2Face training 4500 4500
Face2Face testing 3000 3000
Table 2. Cardinality of each class in the studied datasets. Note
that for both datasets, 10% of the training set was used during the
optimization for model validation.
values in X to the action set A. The chosen classification
task is to minimize the error E(f) = E[l(f(X), Y )], with
l(a, y) = 12 (a− y)2.
Both networks have been implemented with Python 3.5
using the Keras 2.1.5 module [5]. Weights optimization of
the network is achieved with successive batches of 75 im-
ages of size 256 × 256 × 3 using ADAM [13] with de-
fault parameters (β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999). The initial
learning rate of 10−3 is divided by 10 every 1000 iterations
down to 10−6. To improve generalization and robustness,
input batches underwent several slight random transforma-
tions including zoom, rotation, horizontal flips, brightness
and hue changes.
As both network have a relatively small amount of pa-
rameters, few hours of optimization on a standard consumer
grade computer were enough to obtain good scores.
3.3. Image classification results
Classification scores of both trained network are shown
in Table 3 for the Deepfake dataset. Both networks have
reached fairly similar score around 90% considering each
frame independently. We do not expect a higher score since
the dataset contains some facial images extracted with a
very low resolution.
Network Deepfake classification score
Class forged real total
Meso-4 0.882 0.901 0.891
MesoInception-4 0.934 0.900 0.917
Table 3. Classification scores of several networks on the Deepfake
dataset, considering each frame independently.
Table 4 presents results for the Face2Face forgery detec-
tion. We observed a notable deterioration of scores at the
strong video compression level. The paper that introduces
the FaceForensics dataset used in our tests [20] presents bet-
ter classification results using the state-of-the-art network
for image classification Xception [4]. However, with the
configuration given by the latter paper, we only managed to
fine-tune Xception up to obtain a 96.1% score at the com-
pression level 0 and 93.5% score at level 23. It is therefore
unclear how to interpret the results.
Network Face2Face classification score
Compression level 0 23 (light) 40 (strong)
Meso-4 0.946 0.924 0.832
MesoInception-4 0.968 0.934 0.813
Table 4. Classification scores of several networks on the Face-
Forensics dataset, considering each frame independently.
Figure 6. ROC curves of the evaluated classifiers on the Deepfake
dataset (a) and the Face2Face dataset compressed at rate 23 (b).
3.4. Image aggregation
One downside of video analysis, especially online
videos, is the compression which causes a huge loss of in-
formation. But on the other hand, having a succession of
frames of the same face makes it possible to multiply expe-
riences and might help obtain a more accurate overall score
on the video. A natural way of doing so is to average the
network prediction over the video. Theoretically speaking,
there is no justification for a gain in scores or a confidence
interval indicator as frames of a same video are strongly cor-
related to one another. In practice, for the viewer comfort,
most filmed face contain a majority of stable clear frames.
The effect of punctual movement blur, face occlusion and
random misprediction can thus be outweighted by a major-
ity of good predictions on a sample of frames taken from
the video.
Experimental results can be found in Table 5. The image
aggregation significantly improved both detection rate. It
even soared higher than 98% with the MesoInception-4 net-
work on the Deepfake dataset. Note that on the Face2Face
dataset, the same score is reached for both networks but the
misclassified videos are different.
Network Aggregation score
Dataset Deepfake Face2Face (23)
Meso-4 0.969 0.953
MesoInception-4 0.984 0.953
Table 5. Video classification scores on the two dataset using image
aggregation, with the Face2Face dataset compressed at rate 23.
3.5. Aggregation on intra-frames
To extend our study of the effect of video compression
on forgery detection, we have conducted the same image ag-
gregation but only with intra-frames of compressed videos,
i.e. frames that are not interpolated over time, to see if
the reduced amount of compression artifacts would help in-
crease the classification score. The flip side is that videos
only lasting a few second may contain as little as three I-
frames, which cancels out the expected smoothing effect of
the aggregation.
We found out that it rather had a bad effect on the classi-
fication, however the different is slight, as shown in Table 6.
It might be used as a quick aggregation since the resulting
scores are higher than a single image classification.
Network I-Aggregation score Difference
Meso-4 0.932 -0.037
MesoInception-4 0.959 -0.025
Table 6. Classification score variation on the Deepfake dataset us-
ing only I-frames.
3.6. Intuition behind the network
We have tried to understand how those networks solve
the classification problem. This can be done by interpreting
weights of the different convolutional kernel and neurons
as image descriptors. For instance, a sequence of a positive
weight, a negative one, then a positive one again, can be
interpreted as a discrete second order derivation. However,
this is only relevant for the first layer and does not tell much
in the case of faces.
Another way is to generate an input image that maxi-
mizes the activation of a specific filter [6] to see what kind
of signal it is reacting to. Concisely, if we note fij the out-
put of filter j of layer i and x a random image, and we add
a regularization on the input to reduce noise, that idea boils
down to the maximization of E(x) = fij(x)− λ‖x‖p.
Figure 7 shows such maximum activation for several
neurons of the last hidden layer of Meso4. We can separate
those neurons according to the sign of the weight applied
to their output for the final classification decision, thus ac-
counting for whether their activation pushes toward a nega-
tive score, which corresponds to the forged class, or a pos-
itive one for the real class. Strikingly, positive-weighted
neurons activation display images with highly detailed eyes,
nose and mouth areas while negative-weighted ones display
strong details on the background part, leaving a smooth face
area. That’s understandable as Deepfake-generated faces
tend to be blurry, or at least to lack details, compared to
the rest of the image that was left untouched.
We can also take the mean output of a layer for batches
of real and forged images, observe the differences of acti-
Figure 7. Maximum activation of some neurons of the hidden layer
of Meso4. The optimization was done with λ = 10 and p = 6.
vation and interpret the parts of the input images that play
a key role in the classification. If we study the trained
MesoInception-4 network on the deepfake dataset, as it can
be seen in Figure 8, eyes are strongly activated for real im-
ages but not on deepfake images for which the background
shows the highest peaks. We can surmise that it is again a
question of blurriness: the eyes being the most detailed part
of real images while it’s the background in forged images
because of the dimension reduction underwent by the face.
Figure 8. Mean outputs of the Deepfake dataset for the some filters
of the last convolutional layer of MesoInception-4.
4. Conclusion
These days, the dangers of face tampering in video are
widely recognized. We provide two possible network archi-
tectures to detect such forgeries efficiently and with a low
computational cost. In addition, we give access to a dataset
devoted to the Deepfake approach, a very popular yet under-
documented topic to our knowledge. Our experiments show
that our method has an average detection rate of 98% for
Deepfake videos and 95% for Face2Face videos under real
conditions of diffusion on the internet.
One fundamental aspect of deep learning is to be able to
generate a solution to a given problem without the need of
a prior theoretical study. However, it is vital to be able to
understand the origin of this solution in order to evaluate its
qualities and limitations, which is why we spent a signifi-
cant time visualizing the layers and filters of our networks.
We have notably understood that the eyes and mouth play a
paramount role in the detection of faces forged with Deep-
fake. We believe that more tools will emerge in the future
toward an even better understanding of deep networks to
create more effective and efficient ones.
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